

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 254402

46

ORIGIN EUR-03

INFO OCT-01 SS-10 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 /019 R

66619

DRAFTED BY EUR/RPM:EJSTREATOR:DJM

APPROVED BY S/S:REWOODS

EUR:JGLOWENSTEIN

----- 020419

O 190048Z NOV 74 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 254402

LIMDIS

NOFORN

TOSEC 043

THE FOLLOWING REPEATS GENEVA 7010 ACTION SECSTATE

INFO BONN MOSCOW NATO BERLIN 18 NOVEMBER 1974. QUOTE:

S E C R E T GENEVA 7010

LIMDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE PFOR XG

SUBJECT: CSCE: SOVIET UNHAPPINESS WITH FRG ROLE

1. SUMMARY: SINCE SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW,THE SOVIETS
AND THEIR ALLIES HERE HAVE BEGUN WITH INCREASING FRAQUENCY IN
PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS, TO ACCUSE FRG OF TRYING TO STALL
PROGRESS IN CSCE. SOVIET DELEGATION HEAD KOVALEV HAS
MADE VEILED ALLUSIONS TO FRG OBSTRUCTIONISM AND AMBASSADOR
MENDELEVICH AND ANOTHER SOVIET DELOFF WERE MORE EXPLICIT. THESE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 254402

APPROACHES ARE THE STRONGEST EXPRESSION THUS FAR OF THE

SOVIET AND EASTERN SUSPICION OF FRG ROLE IN CSCE WHICH HAS EVIDENTLY BUILT UP SINCE SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER TOOK POWER. MOREOVER IN PRIVATE LUNCHEON FOR A USDEL OFF, A WELL-INFORMED GDR DELOFF GAVE A DETAILED LIST OF SOVIET AND EASTERN COMPLAINTS ABOUT FRG ROLE IN CSCE, AND WENT SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST THAT US SHOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE TO CURB TOUGHER FRG LINE. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT SOVIETS MAY RAISE THEIR CONCERNS ON FRINGES OF THE VLADIVOSTOK MEETING. END SUMMARY.

2. SINCE SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER TOOK OFFICE, IT HAS BEEN EVIDENT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN WATCHING FRG BEHAVIOR CLOSELY FOR INDICATIONS OF ANY CHANGES IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO OSTPOLITIK. A CONVENIENT DAILY BAROMETER OF THIS ATTITUDE HAS BEEN THE CSCE, AND THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES WERE DOUBTLESS DISTURBED TO SEE THE FRG TRYING TO UNRAVEL LAST SUMMER THE COM-PROMISE THEY BELIEVED HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE INVIOLA-BILITY OF FRONTIERS/PEACEFUL CHANGE ISSUE. THE FRG HAS ALSO TAKEN TOUGHER POSITIONS ON MILITARY QUESTIONS AND BASKET III SINCE SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER TOOK OFFICE, AND THIS HAS CERTAINLY FUELED SOVIET SUSPICIONS.

3. SINCE THE SCHMIDT VISIT TO MOSCOW, WE HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY SOVIET DELEGATION HEAD KOVALEV'S VEILED REFERENCES TO UNAMED WESTERN "DELEGATIONS" WHO WERE CONSPIRING TO OBSTRUCT CSCE PROGRESS. TWO KEY SOVIET DELEGATES HAVE SINGLED OUT THE FRG MORE EXPLICITLY, AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH DOING SO DURING NOV. 15 LUNCH CONVERSATION. IN EACH CASE THEY HAVE BEGUN BY NOTING THAT COORDINATION WITHIN THE EC-NINE IS OFTEN DIFFICULT, AND THAT THIS DELAYS CSCE PROGRESS. THEY HAVE THEN SPECIFIED THAT THIS DIFFICULTY RESULTS FROM THE TOUGH ATTITUDES SOME SOME COUNTRIES, LIKE THE FRG, WHICH THEY BELIEVE ARE INTERESTED IN HOLDING UP THE CONFERENCE. THIS ATTITUDE HAS ALSO BEEN EXPRESSED BY OTHER EASTERN DELEGATES, AND WE OF COURSE HAVE DENIED IT, EXPLAINING THAT IT IS ONLY NATURAL, AS STAGE II GETS NEARER TO ITS COMPLETION, THAT THE FRG AND OHTERS WOULD FEEL COMPELLED TO DEFEND THEIR POSITIONS MORE STRONGLY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 254402

4. ON NOV. 15, A WELL-INFORMED MIDDLE-LEVEL GDR DELOFF INVITED A USDEL OFF TO A TETE-A-TETE LUNCHEON IN A SECLUDED PRIVATE APARTMENT, THE FIRST SUCH LUNCHEON INVITATION WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM A GDR DELEGATE. THE GDT DELOFF PROCEEDED TO RUN THROUGH A LITANY OF SOVIET AND EASTERN SUSPICIONS OF THE CURRENT SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD THE FRG IN THE CONFERENCE. GDR COMPLAINTS WERE

AS FOLLOWS (FOR THE SAKE OF BREVITY WE HAVE OMITTED OUR REPLIES, WHICH WERE ALONG STANDARD LINES):

(A) FRG IS TRYING TO REOPEN THE GERMAN QUESTION IN CSCE, DESPITE PRE-CSCE UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE DONE. THIS IS THE REASON FOR TRYING TO REOPEN THE QUESTION OF PLACEMENT AND WORDING OF THE FORMULATION ON PEACEFUL CHANGE. RDR DELOFF TOOK CARE TO INDICATE THAT THIS COMPLAINT DOES NOT APPLY TO QUESTION OF QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS DISCLAIMER, WHICH HE RECOGNIZED WAS SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FOUR POWERS AND NOT APPROPRIATE QUESTION FOR GDR TO RAISE.

(B) FRG IS TRYING TO BROADEN MANDATE FOR DISCUSSIONS OF CBMS, AND HOPES TO USE CBMS FOR INTELLIGENCE-COLLECTION PURPOSES. GDR DELOFF EXPLAINED THAT DETAILS OF "CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION" OF MANEUVERS (E. G. EXPLICIT STATEMENT OF NUMBER OF TROOPS INVOLVED) WERE BEYOND CSCE MANDATE ON CBMS, WHICH IS LIMITED TO PARAMETERS DEFINING WHICH MANEUVERS SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. IT IS ALSO BEYOND MANDATE OF CBM ON MANEUVERS TO NOTIFY MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS TO AND FROM MANEUVER AREA. GDR DELOFF MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS IS A SOVIET COMPLAINT, NOTING THAT USSR IS VERY LARGE AND INFORMATION ON SUCH MOVEMENTS HAS AN INTELLIGENCE VALUE.

(C) FRG IS TRYING TO HOLD UP AGREEMENT ON BASKET III SUBJECTS, AND TO TURN THEM INTO SPECIAL INTER-GERMAN PROBLEMS WHICH TEND TO OPEN THE GERMAN QUESTION IN CSCE. GDR DELOFF CITED TOUGH FRG ATTITUDE ON QUESTION OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN NATIONALS OF DIFFERENT STATES, NOTING THAT NORWAY, WHICH MADE THE WESTERN PROPOSAL ON THIS SUBJECT, HAS ONLY A FEW SUCH MARRIAGES PER YEAR, WHEREAS NUMBER OF GERMAN CASES IS VERY HIGH. MAKING A GERMAN QUESTION OUT OF THE MARRIAGE PROPOSAL WOULD DELAY PROGRESS AND MAKE IT MOST DIFFICULT TO REACH SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 254402

AGREEMENT. (SOVIET DELEGATION HAD PREVIOUSLY INDICATED TO US PRIVATELY THAT THE MARRIAGE PROPOSAL WAS

A GDR PROBLEM). GDR DELOFF ALSO ACCUSED FRG OF BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR DELAY IN AGREEMENT ON REUNIFICATION OF FAMILIES, SINCE THEY DID NOT INTRODUCE THEIR IDEA FOR A CLAUSE ON MINOR CHILDREN UNTIL LAST JUNE, AFTER PROPOSAL HAD BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. IT WAS ONLY WHEN THEY DROPPED THIS IDEA THAT AGREEMENT BECAME POSSIBLE. GDR DELOFF SAID EASTERN COUNTRIES HAD NOTED A RECENT TOUGHENING OF FRG POSITIONS ACROSS THE BOARD IN BASKET III.

(D) FRG HAS TAKEN A TOUGH POSITION IN DISCUSSIONS OF CSCE FOLLOW-UP, AND IS TRYING TO HOLD UP PROGRESS ON THIS SUBJECT.

5. IN GENERAL COMMENTS ON FRG ATTITUDE, GDR DELOFF NOTED RECENT BUNDESTAG DEBATE ON CSCE. HE THOUGHT THIS SHOWED THE FRG GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO TAKE A TOUGHER OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD CSCE, WHICH WOULD CLEARLY MEAN HOLDING UP CONFERENCE PROGRESS. HE THEN WENT SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST THAT THE US USE ITS INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE THE FRG TO TAKE A MORE REASONABLE ATTITUDE, ESPECIALLY ON MILITARY QUESTIONS, WHERE THE US HAS A SPECIAL ROLE. WE OF COURSE REPLIED THAT SUCH A COURSE WAS NEITHER POSSIBLE NOR IN US INTERESTS.

6. WE BELIEVE GDR PREOCCUPATIONS ARE SHARED BY SOVIETS AND HELP TO EXPLAIN THE CURRENT SOVIET ATTITUDE OF SUSPICION TOWARD FRG ROLE IN CSCE, WHICH HAS COME OUT CLEARLY SINCE THE SCHMIDT VISIT TO MOSCOW, AND PERHAPS RESULTS FROM THE TOUGHER FRG POSITIONS ON CSCE WHICH THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE SENSED AT THAT TIME. IN ADDITION, THE GDR EVIDENTLY HAS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE OVER MOSCOW'S THINKING ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS WITHIN CSCE. FOR THESE REASONS WE BELIEVE IT IS AT LEAST POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL USE THE VLADIVOSTOK VISIT TO COMPLAIN TO MEMBERS OF US PARTY ABOUT CURRENT FRG BEHAVIOR IN CSCE, AND TO REQUEST USG ASSISTANCE IN ENCOURAGING A "MORE REASONABLE" FRG ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CONFERENCE. DALE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 254402

UNQUOTE INGERSOLL

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, MEETING DELEGATIONS, TOSEC 43
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 NOV 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CollinP0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974STATE254402
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EJSTREATOR:DJM
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740333-0417
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741131/aaaaazoe.tel
Line Count: 203
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CollinP0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 14 MAY 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <14 MAY 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <18 MAR 2003 by CollinP0>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CSCE: SOVIET UNHAPPINESS WITH FRG ROLE
TAGS: PFOR, XG, UR, GE, CSCE
To: TOKYO
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005